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Abstract. In this paper, I give an account and critique of what I call ‘Traditional 
Islamic Exclusivism’ – a specific Islamic interpretation of religious exclusivism. 
This Islamic version of religious exclusivism rests on exclusivist attitudes 
towards truth, epistemic justification and salvation. After giving an  account 
of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism by explaining its theological roots in the 
Qur’an and ahadith (reports of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad), 
I proceed to critique it. I do so by arguing that Islamic epistemic exclusivism, 
which forms the main core of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism, is implausible. 
This criticism subsequently opens up further lines of criticism and discussion of 
both salvific and alethic exclusivism in an Islamic context. I conclude with some 
remarks about the implications and significance of my criticisms of Traditional 
Islamic Exclusivism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion has seen a  lot of discussion 
surrounding religious exclusivism, mainly due to the fact that philosophers 
of religion have, over the last few decades, started to take seriously the 
rich diversity in beliefs about religion. As John Hick explains, for a long 
time the labels ‘Philosophy of Religion’ and ‘Philosophy of The Christian 
Religion’ were treated as synonymous.1 It is only during the last couple of 
decades that philosophers of religion in the West have, in Hick’s words, 
‘increasingly felt obliged to take note of the fact that Christianity is only 
one of the great world faiths and that monotheism is only one of the 
1 John Hick, ‘Religious Pluralism’, in Charles Taliaferro et al., A Companion to The 
Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), pp. 710-17 
(p. 710).
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major types of religion’.2 According to many philosophers of religion 
such as Hick, incorporating facts about the world’s religious diversity 
into an assessment of the plausibility of religious claims is important. It 
also calls into question the reasonableness of maintaining an exclusivist 
attitude in religious matters.
But what is religious exclusivism? Even just a  cursory survey of 
the relevant literature reveals that there is no consensus on how to 
understand it and that it is construed in a  variety of different (and 
sometimes confusing) ways. David K. Clark, for example, understands 
it as follows: ‘Only one true religion leads to God. Attaining the spiritual 
goal requires a believer to find and follow the one true faith, for other 
religious paths will not lead to the spiritual goal.’3 Discussing religious 
exclusivism specifically within an  Islamic context, Zain Ali defines 
what he calls ‘Muslim Exclusivism’ as follows: ‘Islamic theism is overall 
epistemically superior [sic] and that all other incompatible beliefs are 
false.’4 In just these two definitions alone, we see that religious exclusivism 
can be understood with reference to three distinct matters, even if they 
are conceptually connected: truth, epistemic justification and salvation.
In this paper, I  will discuss religious exclusivism in an  Islamic 
context. In particular, I will focus on exclusivism with respect to truth, 
epistemic justification and salvation in the Islamic religion – three tiers 
that form the basis of what I will call ‘Traditional Islamic Exclusivism’. 
I  will give an  account of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism by basing it 
on the traditional Islamic understanding of religious truth, epistemic 
justification and salvation, after which I will proceed to critique it. I will 
then conclude with some remarks about the implications and significance 
of my assessment of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism.
II. TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC EXCLUSIVISM EXPLAINED
I  will give the label Traditional Islamic Exclusivism to a  view that, 
as I  shall construe it, is comprised of a  conjunction of three distinct 
positions situated within an  Islamic context and based on traditional 
2 Ibid.
3 David K. Clark, ‘Religious Pluralism and Christian Exclusivism’, in Francis 
J. Beckwith et al., To Everyone An Answer, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 
pp. 291-307 (p. 293).
4 Zain Ali, Faith, Philosophy and The Reflective Muslim (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), p. 138.
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Islamic understanding: (1) alethic exclusivism, (2) epistemic exclusivism 
and (3) salvific exclusivism. Let me explain these in turn.
2.1 Alethic Exclusivism
First, I understand alethic exclusivism as follows. A person is an alethic 
exclusivist with respect to a  proposition p if and only if, in believing 
that p is true, she takes to be false any beliefs that are incompatible 
with p. Thus understood, alethic exclusivism sounds obviously true and 
uncontroversial; indeed, it seems to be one of the fundamental principles 
that guide our reasoning. We believe in the falsity of propositions like 
‘Abraham Lincoln is alive’ or ‘George W. Bush is the President of The 
United States’ precisely because we believe that the propositions ‘Abraham 
Lincoln is dead’ and ‘Barack Obama is the President of The United States’ 
are true. Those who subscribe to alethic exclusivism within an Islamic 
context will maintain the falsity of those beliefs that are incompatible 
with Muslim belief. For example, the Muslim alethic exclusivist will 
believe in the falsity of the propositions ‘Zeus exists’ or ‘Jesus is the son 
of God’ because their falsity is entailed by Muslim belief.
In addition to being a basic principle underlying rationality, alethic 
exclusivism also follows from a  natural interpretation of the primary 
source of authority in Islam, the Qur’an. In reading the Islamic 
Scripture, one will constantly find denials of religious propositions that 
are incompatible with those that are affirmed as part of Islamic belief. 
In affirming the existence of Allah as the only God, for instance, the 
Qur’an denies the existence of any other deity (2:163). Or, to consider 
another example, in affirming the strict Islamic understanding of God’s 
(indivisible) oneness (112:1), the Qur’an rejects the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity (4:171). Many more examples of this sort can be found in 
the text.
2.2 Epistemic Exclusivism
Next, epistemic exclusivism. It is epistemic exclusivism that, as I see it, 
provides the principle basis and spirit of religious exclusivism in Islam. 
As with alethic exclusivism, epistemic exclusivism can be understood 
more generally without reference to religion. Here is how I will construe 
it. A person is an epistemic exclusivist with respect to proposition p if 
and only if, in believing that epistemic justification exists for p, she rejects 
the existence of epistemic justification for any propositions incompatible 
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with p.  Why would a  person be attracted to epistemic exclusivism, 
thus understood? There are a  few possible answers. One that is pretty 
common is when a person believes that the epistemic justification for p 
is so strong or overwhelming that the existence of epistemic justification 
for propositions incompatible with p is highly unlikely.5 As an example, 
consider Richard Dawkins’ views about evolution and Young-Earth 
creationism, two incompatible perspectives about the origins of life 
and species on our planet. In his book The Greatest Show on Earth,6 
Dawkins states that ‘[t]he evidence for evolution grows by the day, and 
has never been stronger ... the “theory” of evolution is actually a fact – as 
incontrovertible a fact as any in science’.7 He compares those who would 
deny evolution to people who believe that the Roman Empire never 
existed or that the Holocaust never happened.8 Indeed, for Dawkins, the 
evidence for evolution is so strong that, as he stated controversially in 
1989, ‘It is absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody who claims 
not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid or insane (or 
wicked, but I’d rather not consider that).’9 Furthermore, given his belief in 
the preponderance of evidence supporting evolution, Dawkins has always 
maintained that any ‘evidence’ to the contrary, particularly in support of 
Young-Earth creationism, is virtually non-existent. For instance, he states 
more recently: ‘Just as I wouldn’t expect a gynaecologist to have a debate 
with somebody who believes in the Stork-theory of reproduction, I won’t 
do debates with Young Earth creationists.’10
The kind of epistemic exclusivism that I  have described here is 
evident in traditional Islamic belief. Consider the two core beliefs 
5 It may be helpful to compare Gilbert Harman’s explanation of how one can dismiss 
alleged evidence for not-p as ‘misleading’ in cases where one actually knows p: ‘If I know 
that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true; 
so I know that such evidence is misleading.’ See Gilbert Harman, Thought (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 148.
6 Richard Dawkins, The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidence for Evolution, (New 
York: Free Press, 2010).
7 Ibid., p. vii.
8 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
9 Richard Dawkins, ‘Ignorance is No Crime’, The Richard Dawkins Foundation, 
available at: <http://old.richarddawkins.net/articles/114> (last accessed 1/30/14).
10 Stoyan Zaimov, ‘Richard Dawkins Explains Why He Doesn’t Debate Young-Earth 
Creationists’, The Christian Post, available at: <http://www.christianpost.com/news/
richard-dawkins-explains-why-he-doesnt-debate-young-earth-creationists-107196/> 
(last accessed 1/30/14).
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of the Islamic religion that are expressed in the Shahada, the Muslim 
declaration of faith11 – belief in the existence and oneness of God and 
belief in Muhammad as God’s Prophet. Both the Qur’an and the ahadith 
are clear that there is very strong epistemic justification for both of these 
beliefs and very little, if any, for those beliefs incompatible with them. In 
what follows, I will itemize (in no particular order) the different types of 
epistemic justification for belief in the existence and oneness of God as 
well as belief in Muhammad as God’s Prophet, according to traditional 
Islamic understanding:
(1) Belief in God as Our Original, Natural Disposition (Fitrah): In 
a well-known hadith, the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: 
‘Every child is born with a true faith of Islam [fitrah] ... but his parents 
convert him to Judaism, Christianity or Magianism, as an animal delivers 
a perfect baby animal. Do you find it mutilated?’12 The reference to fitrah 
is a  reference to what, according to Islamic tradition, is our original 
disposition to recognize and worship only God (i.e. to be Muslims). The 
Qur’an also affirms this understanding of the term: ‘So direct your face 
toward the religion, inclining to truth. [Adhere] to the fitrah of Allah 
upon which He has created [all] people. There is no altering of Allah’s 
creation.’ (30:30) For this reason, many individuals who come to Islam 
after leaving their non-Islamic faith or worldview refer to themselves 
as reverts and not converts;13 the idea here is that such individuals are 
returning to their original disposition to be Muslims. One way that the 
concept of fitrah can be used to support Islamic epistemic exclusivism 
is as follows: While belief in the existence and oneness of Allah is our 
natural disposition, beliefs that are incompatible with this cornerstone 
of Islamic doctrine can be dismissed as epistemically unjustified, as they 
are held merely on the basis of taqlid (imitation).14
11 Translated into English, the Shahada reads as follows: ‘There is no god but God, 
Muhammad is the Messenger of God.’
12 Sahih Bukhari, 2:441, available at: <http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/bukhari/bh2/
bh2_442.htm> (last accessed 1/30/14).
13 See, for example, ‘10 embrace Islam in Riyadh’, Arab News, Tuesday, 4 February, 
2014, available at: <http://www.arabnews.com/news/520291> (last accessed 2/5/2014). 
A search for the word ‘revert’ on this website’s search engine brings up dozens of stories 
of people ‘reverting’ to Islam.
14 The term is typically used by Muslim apologists in a  pejorative sense and as 
a synonym for ‘blind belief/faith’. See Al-Ghazali’s discussion of taqlid as a belief forming 
mechanism to be contrasted with fitrah in his ‘Deliverance from Error’, in W. Montgomery 
Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 21.
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(2) The ‘Islamic Anthropological Argument’: A further component 
of epistemic justification for the Muslim view that Islam is our primordial 
religion comes by way of what I shall term The ‘Islamic Anthropological 
Argument’. In essence, the argument maintains that every nation on 
earth was sent a messenger calling people to worship Allah alone and 
to shun all false deities (e.g. see Qur’an 10:47, 16:36 and 35:24). Some 
of these messengers are mentioned by name in the Qur’an while others 
are not, a  point acknowledged explicitly in the text itself (40:78). The 
Islamic Anthropological Argument serves to augment the Muslim 
understanding of fitrah by pointing out that the messengers of God 
were sent to people of all nations to bring them back to the straight path 
of Islam (Qur’an  2:213). Islamic tradition maintains that our natural 
disposition is to worship God alone, even if it is subsequently corrupted. 
The pagan Arabs of Muhammad’s time, for instance, acknowledged that 
God owns all that is in the heavens and the earth; that He is the Lord of 
the seven heavens; and, that in His Hand is dominion over all things. 
Despite believing all of this, they dismissed the (Islamic) belief in bodily 
resurrection as false. In noting all this, the Qur’an labels them as deluded 
and liars (23:81-89).
(3) Qur’anic Arguments for The Existence and Oneness of God: The 
Qur’an presents two main arguments for the existence of God as further 
sources of epistemic justification for Islamic belief. The Spanish Muslim 
philosopher, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), provides a helpful discussion of these 
two arguments in his The Exposition of The Methods of Proof.15 According 
to Ibn Rushd, the two main Qur’anic arguments for the existence of God 
are best understood as arguments from providence and invention. Based 
on his discussion,16 we can present these arguments in standard form as 
follows:
The Argument from Providence
(1) All existing things (found in the world) are suited to man’s 
existence.
(2) Things that are suitable for man’s existence are necessarily so 
due to an  Agent both willing and intending such suitability. 
         a. The suitability in question cannot be due to chance.
15 See the translation of this work in Ibrahim Y. Najjar, (trans.), Faith and Reason in 
Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001).
16 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
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(3)  (Therefore) There exists an Agent (i.e. God) who providentially 
ordered the world for man.
The Argument from Invention
(1) All existing things (animals, plants, etc.) are invented.
(2) For everything invented, there is an inventor.
(3) (Therefore) There exists an Inventor (i.e. God) of every existing 
thing in the world.
After giving an  account of The Argument from Providence and The 
Argument from Invention, Ibn Rushd maintains that these two arguments 
‘are the arguments favoured by religion’.17 Qur’anic verses drawing our 
attention to evidence that points to the existence of God refer to (1) 
The Argument from Providence (e.g. 78:6-16), (2) The Argument from 
Invention (e.g. 86:5, 88:17, 22:73) or (3) a combination of The Argument 
from Providence and The Argument from Invention (e.g. 2:20-23).18
The Qur’an also presents some arguments for the oneness of God and 
against polytheism. The seeds of these arguments are found in verses 
like: ‘Say: If there had been (other) gods with Him, as they say, behold, 
they would certainly have sought out a way to the Lord of the Throne!’ 
(17:42); and, ‘If there were therein gods beside Allah, then verily both 
(the heavens and the earth) would have been disordered. Glorified be 
Allah, the Lord of the Throne, from all that they ascribe (unto Him).’ 
(21:22) Verse 23:91 explicitly repudiates the Christian doctrine of the 
divinity of Jesus as well as the doctrine of the Trinity: ‘Allah has not taken 
any son, nor has there ever been with Him any deity. [If there had been], 
then each deity would have taken what it created, and some of them 
would have sought to overcome others. Exalted is Allah above what they 
describe [concerning Him].’ Based on such verses, Muslim thinkers like 
‘Abd al-Jabbar and al-Ghazali formulated sophisticated arguments for 
the conclusion that there can be only one divine being.19
(4) The ‘Inimitability’ Argument for The Qur’an’s Divine Origin and 
The Prophet of Muhammad: Islamic tradition has typically maintained 
17 Ibid., p. 35.
18 Ibid.
19 See, for example, ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s ‘Book of the Five Fundamentals’, in Richard C. 
Martin et. al, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern 
Symbol (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997), pp.  90-115 (p.  96); and, ‘Al-Ghazali’s 
Tract on Dogmatic Theology’, edited, translated, annotated and introduced by A. L. 
Tibawi, Islamic Quarterly, IX (1965), 65-122 (p. 104).
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that the primary miracle of the Prophet Muhammad is the Qur’an.20 The 
miracle of the Qur’an is said to prove that Muhammad is God’s Prophet 
(and ipso facto that there is a God, since Muhammad is God’s Prophet 
only if God exists). Andrew Rippin summarizes the argument from 
the Qur’an’s miraculousness, which originated during the early days of 
Islam, as follows:
It would appear that, early on, Muslims had to defend their nascent 
religion against Christian theological attack in the area of the Fertile 
Crescent, especially Iraq. The following argument was constructed: 
miracles prove the status of Prophethood and the Qur’ān is Muhammad’s 
miracle; therefore, Muhammad was truly a prophet and Islam is a true, 
revealed religion. All participants in the debate appear to have agreed on 
the first premise. What Muslims had to prove, and Christians disprove, 
was the validity [sic] of the second, for the conclusion, the truth of Islam, 
stood or fell on its credibility.21
As Rippin explains, the controversial premise here is whether the 
Qur’an is indeed a ‘miracle’. The classical Islamic argument that emerged 
to support this premise is based on the alleged ‘inimitability’ of the 
Muslim Scripture. Rippin explains this argument thus:
Over time, the argument became one concerned to prove the ‘inimitability’ 
of the Qur’ān, an argument which, its proponents were quick to point 
out, had a basis in the Qur’ān itself... [T]he production of a text ‘like’ the 
20 It is controversial within the Islamic tradition whether the Prophet Muhammad 
performed any miracles outside of bringing the revelation of the Qur’an. There are 
numerous ahadith that document Muhammad performing miracles such as splitting the 
moon, causing water to spring from his hands or multiplying a small quantity of food 
that fed over one thousand people (see Sahih Al-Bukhari, Volume 5, Book 58, No. 208; 
Volume 1, Book 4, No. 170 and Volume 5, Book 59, No. 428). The Qur’an, however, seems 
to strongly suggest that Muhammad performed no miracles apart from conveying the 
revelation of the Qur’an. In verses 17:90-93, for instance, we read that the unbelievers 
asked the Prophet to perform miracles, such as causing a spring to gush from the ground 
or have fragments of heaven fall upon them. In response, Muhammad says that here 
is merely a  messenger. Verses 25:7-8 also note that the unbelievers complained that 
Muhammad did not come across as extraordinary or a performer of miracles. Based on 
such Qur’anic data, a number of Muslim thinkers, such as Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 
have maintained that the revelation of the Qur’an  was the only miracle that one can 
legitimately ascribe to the Prophet Muhammad. See Haykal’s The Life of Muhammad 
(Kuala Lumpur: Academe Art & Printing Services, 2008), pp. lxxxvi-lxxxvii.
21 Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, Third Edition 
(London: Routledge, 2005), p. 38.
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Qur’ān is encouraged but known to be impossible: ‘Produce a sūra like it 
[i.e., the Qur’ān], and call on whom you can, besides God, if you speak 
truthfully’ (Qur’ān 10/38); ‘Well then bring ten chapters the like of it, 
forged!’ (Qur’ān 11/13). God has given the Qur’ān to Muhammad and 
because of its divine origin, no text ‘like’ it can, in fact, be produced. The 
inimitability of the text proves its divine authorship and thus its status 
as a miracle, confirming Muhammad’s role and the veracity of Islam.22
According to Issa J. Boullata, general Muslim consensus maintains 
that the inimitability of the Qur’anic text refers mainly to its stylistic 
supremacy, which is held to be all the more remarkable given that the 
Qur’anic revelation was proclaimed by Muhammad, an illiterate man.23 
Muslim tradition maintains that this challenge to produce something 
similar to the Qur’an has never been successfully met since it was first 
raised. This alleged fact is offered as strong evidence for the divine origin 
of the Qur’an and the Prophethood of Muhammad.
In reading the Qur’an and ahadith, one gathers the impression that 
the four sources of epistemic justification I  have itemized above see 
Islamic belief in the existence and oneness of God as well as belief in 
Muhammad as God’s Prophet as being accompanied by very strong 
epistemic justification. Indeed, at times, the Author of the Qur’an uses 
an  incredulous tone in noting rejection of Islamic belief, as in the 
following verse: ‘How can ye reject the faith in Allah? – seeing that ye 
were without life, and He gave you life; then will He cause you to die, 
and will again bring you to life; and again to Him will ye return.’ (2:28) 
Or again, ‘Can there be any doubt concerning Allah, the Creator of the 
heavens and the earth?’ (14:10) It is not surprising then that, for the 
average Muslim, Islam ‘coincides in his mind with the irresistible logic 
of things’, as Frithjof Schuon puts it.24 A corollary of this aspect of the 
Qur’anic Weltanschauung is that the only alternative to having Islamic 
faith is deliberate and perverse rejection of it; that is to say, having 
Islamic faith or deliberately and perversely rejecting it are not only two 
mutually exclusive states of affairs, but they are also, according to the 
Qur’an, jointly exhaustive. In the Islamic Scripture, there is no room for 
22 Ibid.
23 Issa J. Boullata, ‘The Rhetorical Interpretation of the Qur’an: I’jaz and Related 
Topics’ in Approaches to The History of The Interpretations of The Qur’an, Andrew Rippin, 
(ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 139-157 (p. 142).
24 Frithjof Schuon, Stations of Wisdom (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom Books, 
1961), p. 64, note 1.
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non-belief that arises from, say, ignorance or (sincere) incredulity.25 Based 
on all of this, it seems that epistemic exclusivism, as I have construed it, 
is indeed a significant component of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism.
2.3 Salvific Exclusivism
The final component of what I  have termed Traditional Islamic 
Exclusivism is salvific exclusivism, which I  will interpret as follows. 
A person is a salvific exclusivist with respect to a religion r if and only if, 
in believing that acceptance of r (or acceptance of its essential doctrines) 
leads to salvation, she rejects the view that religions other than r can lead 
to salvation.26 A  Muslim salvific exclusivist is one who maintains that 
acceptance of Islam is the only means to salvation; no other religion can 
offer such salvation. Achievement or loss of salvation, as understood in 
traditional Islam, is strongly associated with, if not reducible to, a person’s 
entry into paradise or punishment in hell; and, whether a  person is 
‘saved’ or not is principally determined by whether he or she responded 
appropriately to Islamic belief (see e.g. Qur’an 2:82, 3:133, 5:119, 2:24, 
4:55-56).
Perhaps the clearest statement of salvific exclusivism in the Qur’an is 
in verse 3:85: ‘And whoever desires a religion other than Islam, it shall 
not be accepted from him, and in the hereafter he shall be one of the 
losers.’ Now, the Qur’an does contain some verses stating that followers 
of other religions, such as Judaism and Christianity, will achieve salvation 
(e.g. 2:62; 5:69). It is difficult to assess what bearing such verses have on 
the traditional Islamic understanding of salvation, however, for a  few 
reasons. First, these verses, which are few in number, contradict the 
ethos of the Qur’an as well as the ahadith, which generally subscribes 
to salvific exclusivism. Second, there are claims in both the Qur’an and 
ahadith explicitly stating that Jews and Christians will be condemned to 
hell for their beliefs. Consider, as an example, verses 5:72-73: ‘They do 
blaspheme who say: “Allah is Christ the son of Mary” ... Whoever joins 
other gods with Allah, – Allah will forbid him the garden, and the Fire 
will be his abode ... They surely disbelieve who say: Lo! Allah is the third 
25 For more discussion on this, see Imran Aijaz, ‘Some Ruminations about Inculpable 
Non-belief ’, Religious Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (2013), 399-419, esp. 405-407.
26 This understanding of salvific exclusivism can easily be modified to refer to specific 
denominations of religions, world ‘philosophies’, etc. But such a  modification is not 
required for my purposes in this paper.
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of three; when there is no Allah save the One Allah. If they desist not 
from so saying a painful doom will fall on those of them who disbelieve.’ 
(see also 98:6) And, in one particular hadith, the Prophet Muhammad is 
reported to have said: ‘By Him in Whose hand is the life of Muhammad, 
he who amongst the community of Jews or Christians hears about me, 
but does not affirm his belief in that with which I have been sent and dies 
in this state (of disbelief), he shall be but one of the denizens of Hell-
Fire.’27 Third, a number of Islamic scholars have maintained that verse 
3:85, which affirms that salvation comes through adherence to Islam 
alone, abrogates those verses that mention the possibility of salvation for 
non-Muslims, such as Jews and Christians.28
A  helpful summary account of the traditional understanding of 
salvific exclusivism in Islam is given by Sheikh Muhammed Salih Al-
Munajjid, who writes:
Allaah has clearly created everything, sent His blessings on His creation, 
and sent Messengers and Revealed Books to tell them that whoever 
believes in and worships Him alone, not associating any partner 
with Him, will enter Paradise, and whoever denies Him, or worships 
something else besides Him, or takes other gods instead of Him, or says 
that He has a wife or son, or that the angels are His daughters, or follows 
a law other than that which He revealed to judge between people in truth, 
or turns away from His religion, will be doomed in the Hereafter to the 
eternal punishment of Hell. This is exact justice, and this will be the fate 
deserved by the one who did not give his Creator His due.29
The thought here seems to be that, given the overwhelming evidence and 
justification for Islamic belief, religious beliefs and practices contrary 
to Islamic doctrine must constitute deliberate and perverse denial 
of the truth. And this, in turns, merits eternal punishment in hell  – 
a consequence of God’s Justice.
So, here is how the three exclusivist strands in Traditional Islamic 
Exclusivism – alethic, epistemic and salvific – come together. According 
27 Sahih Muslim, Book 1, No. 284, available at: <http://www.hadithcollection.com/
sahihmuslim/129-Sahih%20Muslim%20Book%2001.%20Faith/8500-sahih-muslim-
book-001-hadith-number-0284.html> (last accessed 3/14/14).
28 See, for instance Al-Tabari’s The Commentary on The Qur’an, Volume 1, J. Cooper, 
(ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 364.
29 Sheikh Muhammed Salih Al-Munajjid, ‘The Muslim belief concerning the destiny 
of non-Muslim monotheists in the Hereafter’, Islam QA, available at: <http://islamqa.
info/en/434> (last accessed 3/15/14).
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to traditional Islamic understanding, there is very good evidence and 
justification for Islamic belief. Such evidence is available to everyone 
and points to the truth of God’s existence and oneness as well as the 
Prophethood of Muhammad. Consequently, people should acknowledge 
the truth of Islamic belief and reject as false those beliefs that are 
incompatible with it. Those who fail to do this – all non-Muslims – do so 
because of their obstinate rejection of it (kufr). Such perverse rejection 
of Islamic belief merits eternal punishment in hell, as an instance of God 
exercising His Justice.
III. TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC EXCLUSIVISM CRITIQUED
In this section, the central thesis around which I will form my assessment 
of, and arguments against, Traditional Islamic Exclusivism is that it 
is highly implausible. I  will begin by arguing that Islamic epistemic 
exclusivism is not tenable. My case against it will consequently open up 
a line of criticism against Islamic salvific exclusivism. Finally, I will assess 
what implications my views regarding epistemic and salvific exclusivism 
have for alethic exclusivism in an Islamic context.
3.1. Problems with Islamic Epistemic Exclusivism
As we have seen, the Islamic epistemic exclusivist affirms two key claims. 
First, there is (strong) epistemic justification for Islamic belief – belief 
in the existence and oneness of God, alongside belief in Muhammad as 
God’s Prophet. Second, there is little, if any, epistemic justification for 
beliefs that are incompatible with Islamic belief. I will consider these two 
claims in turn, starting with an assessment of the four alleged sources of 
epistemic justification for Islamic belief.
To begin with, the claim that belief in the existence and oneness of 
God is our original, natural disposition (fitrah) seems, on the face of it, 
patently false. Perhaps the most obvious objection to it is that it appears 
to be incompatible with a  number of facts about our global religious 
landscape.30 Consider, the fact that there are plenty of people in the 
world who do not believe that there is a God or that there is only one 
God. As of 2010, there were 500 million Buddhists in the world, people 
30 See ‘The Global Religious Landscape’, Pew Research Center Forum on Religion 
& Public Life, available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-
landscape-exec/> (last accessed 3/26/14).
197CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC EXCLUSIVISM
who do not believe in the existence of any being like Allah.31 Consider 
also the fact that Christianity and Hinduism, religions whose members 
typically reject the Islamic claim that God is strictly one, collectively 
had a  total of 3.2 billion followers.32 Indeed, the specific Islamic belief 
in the existence and oneness of God seems to be held by only a minority 
of the world’s population.33 Based on these data, one can construct the 
following argument: (1) If belief in the existence and oneness of God 
is our natural disposition, we would not see such diversity in beliefs 
about religion. Given that (2) we do, however, see such diversity, one can 
conclude that (3) belief in the existence and oneness of God is not our 
natural disposition. How might one reply to this argument? Well, given 
the validity of its modus tollens form, and the obvious truth of the second 
premise, the only recourse left for someone who wants to rationally resist 
accepting the argument’s conclusion is to reject the first premise.
One way to do this is by arguing that the Islamic understanding of 
God’s existence and oneness can be found in all of the various world 
religions and philosophies, albeit in ways that are subtle. For instance, 
it may be argued that, underneath layers of theological embellishments 
and aberrations in their respective religions, Jews, Christians, Sikhs 
and members of other theistic worldviews do, in fact, believe in the 
existence and oneness of God. Such a  move is, however, problematic, 
for at least two reasons. First, although the beliefs of some, such as 
Jews and Christians, can perhaps be accommodated into the Islamic 
understanding of God’s existence and oneness (despite the evidence 
cited above to the contrary), it will take quite a stretch of imagination to 
do this for the beliefs of others, such as Buddhists, Jains and adherents 
of non-theistic religions and philosophies. It is hard to see, for instance, 
how the Buddhist religion can be described as essentially Muslim, 
given the Buddhism’s explicit denial of theism. Connected to this is the 
hermeneutical problem of accounting for those portions of the Islamic 
texts that explicitly repudiate other religions and philosophies because of 
their denial of God’s existence and oneness.34
Another way to attempt to reconcile the traditional Islamic 
understanding of fitrah with some of the facts about religious diversity 
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 In the study conducted by the Pew Research Center, the population of Muslims in 
the world as of 2010 was 1.6 billion, or 23% of the world’s population.
34 See section 2.3 above.
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cited above is to try and discredit those beliefs incompatible with 
Islamic belief by maintaining that they arise (merely) due to social 
conditioning or sin (or both). The idea here is that although everyone is 
born in a state of fitrah, social conditioning or sin prevents people from 
responding appropriately to their innate nature; and, it is this responding 
inappropriately that regrettably results in the kind of religious diversity 
that we see today. Here is how Sheikh ‘Abd al-Rahmaan al-Barraak 
explains this:
What it means when it is said that a child is born as a Muslim is that he 
is born inherently ready, when he reaches the age of discretion, if he is 
given the choice between Islam and its opposite, to prefer Islam over its 
opposite and to choose Islam as his religion, so long as there is nothing 
to prevent him from doing so, such as his whims and desires or tribalism. 
Following his desires makes him prefer falsehood so that he may attain 
some share of leadership or wealth, and tribalism or racial pride makes 
him follow his forefathers or elders, even if they are not following true 
guidance.35
This response essentially maintains that an  informed, reasonable 
rejection of Islamic belief is not possible. Those engaging in religious 
practices that are incompatible with Islam are motivated primarily by 
vices such as whims and desires, tribalism, racial pride, etc. It is difficult 
to avoid seeing this sort of reply as merely dogmatic, especially when it 
seems that it cannot be supplemented by an argument that does not beg 
the question.36 Not only that, but it relies on claims that are simply not 
plausible. Surely, there are plenty of cases involving informed, reasonable 
rejection of Islamic belief. Let us just consider the theistic component of 
Islamic belief. In 2009, David Bourget and David Chalmers conducted 
a survey of 1,972 philosophers in 99 leading departments of philosophy.37 
The found that 72.8% of the philosophers surveyed either accepted or 
35 Islam QA, ‘What is the fault of children born in a kaafir environment?’, available at: 
<http://islamqa.info/en/11783> (last accessed 3/27/14).
36 Here, Karl Barth’s famous interview comes to mind, where he declares that 
Hinduism is a  form of unbelief and that Hindus are in rebellion against God. When 
asked how he knew this, since he had never previously met a Hindu, Barth replied that 
he knew this ‘a priori’. As cited in James Lee Fredericks, Faith Among Faiths: Christian 
Theology and Non-Christian Religions (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1999), p. 21.
37 David Bourget and David Chalmers, ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical 
Studies (December, 2013), pp. 1-36.
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leaned towards atheism.38 Are we to think, then, that most philosophers 
today who are atheistic are simply irrational in their rejection of theism, 
or that their dismissal of theism is motivated simply by whims and desires, 
tribalism or racial pride? Are there no reasonable philosophers, those 
like the late J.L. Mackie, for instance, who predicate their rejection of 
God’s existence on a careful consideration of the evidence?39 Answering 
these questions in the negative not only seems implausible40 but comes 
across as the epitome of close-mindedness. Furthermore, there is no 
independent evidence suggesting that the beliefs of all non-Muslims 
who do not accept Islamic belief can be explained by appealing to social 
conditioning or sin. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary. Consider 
once again the family of philosophers, many of whom are trained 
specifically to avoid basing their convictions on beliefs that are popular, 
traditional, politically correct, emotionally appealing, etc. Indeed, in its 
history, argument forms like appeal to popularity, appeal to tradition, 
appeal to emotion, etc., have long been recognized as fallacious in 
logic  – a  core component in the study of philosophy. To be sure, this 
does not mean that sociological factors have no influence on the work 
done by philosophers, but it does suggest that a blanket dismissal of what 
philosophers believe (e.g. that God does not exist), by appealing to social 
conditioning, is not plausible.
But what of sin as a viable explanation of the beliefs of non-Muslims, 
beliefs that are incompatible with Islamic belief? If the reference to sin 
is taken to refer primarily to moral vices such as pride (a cardinal sin in 
Islam; see e.g. Qur’an 2:34) that prevent people from recognizing their 
being in a  state of fitrah, then we are lead to what I  call ‘The Gandhi 
Problem’. This problem essentially concerns reconciling (1) the view that 
38 Ibid. 14.6% accepted or leaned towards theism, while 12.6% accepted or leaned 
towards the option of ‘other’.
39 Mackie’s The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) is widely 
regarded among philosophers as one of the best works in philosophy of religion from 
an atheistic perspective. In his review of the book, Robert Adams (himself a theist) calls 
Mackie’s work ‘a book that will surely rank for some time among the best of philosophical 
“apologies” for atheism. The standard of exposition and argument is high, and Mackie’s 
fair-mindedness is exemplary. He critically, but in many ways sympathetically, examines 
an  impressive array of theistic arguments’, Robert Merrihew Adams, Review of ‘The 
Miracle of Theism, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 95, No. 2 (April, 1986), 309-316 
(p. 309).
40 Especially in light of some of the criticisms of the Islamic arguments for the 
existence of God mentioned below.
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non-Muslims who hold beliefs incompatible with Islamic belief do so 
because of their sin, despite the fact that (2) many such non-Muslims 
are morally upright and virtuous individuals, people such as Mahatma 
Gandhi (a  Hindu) or Mother Teresa (a  Catholic). The more general 
version of this problem states that non-Muslims who do believe in things 
contrary to Islamic belief do not appear to be stubbornly resisting the 
Islamic religion our of pride, selfishness, etc. Rather, they simply do not 
hold Islamic belief.41
So, until further argument can be given to the contrary, the claim 
that belief in the existence and oneness of God is our original, natural 
disposition seems untrue. Facts about religious diversity suggest that 
(Islamic) theism is not epistemically privileged in the way that the 
concept of fitrah would have us believe.
My treatment of The Islamic Anthropological Argument will be brief, 
simply because, outside of the traditional Islamic account of it, there is 
no external historical evidence supporting the idea that every nation 
on earth was sent a  messenger calling people to (return to) Islamic 
monotheism – the primordial core of all world religions and philosophies. 
The traditional Islamic view is very similar to the hypothesis of ‘primitive 
monotheism’ (Urmonotheismus), presented and defended by thinkers 
like Andrew Lang and Wilhelm Schmidt over a century ago.42 In essence, 
this hypothesis maintains that all world religions and philosophies that 
are not monotheistic degraded from a  monotheistic Urreligion, which 
consisted of belief in a deity who is eternal, the creator, omniscient and 
beneficent.43 One problem with this hypothesis is that we do not have the 
means to fully assess its historical credibility.44 Another problem with it 
is that there are alternative and better hypotheses that account for the 
origin and development of religion, such as the evolutionary theory. Not 
only is this particular theory supported by strong evidence, but it also 
contradicts the notion of an Urmonotheismus by placing monotheism at 
41 For further discussion of this particular point, see Aijaz, ‘Some Ruminations about 
Inculpable Non-belief ’, pp. 12-19.
42 Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), pp.23-24.
43 Ibid., p. 24.
44 Ibid., p. 25. For a summary account of some of the problems with Lang and Schmidt’s 
work, see E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1965), pp. 103-105.
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the end of a long line of religious evolution.45 These are just two problems 
facing anyone who wants to defend the Islamic Anthropological 
Argument along the lines of the hypothesis of an Urmonotheismus.
Turning now to the Qur’anic arguments for the existence and oneness 
of God, these arguments come across as superficial and unconvincing, 
being susceptible to criticisms that are familiar in the Philosophy of 
Religion. The Argument from Providence fails because it relies on 
premises that are at best questionable and its conclusion does not carry 
much weight in providing evidence for Islamic monotheism. Consider 
the first premise of this argument, which states that all existing things 
(found in the world) are suited to our existence. This is clearly false, as 
a moment’s reflection on instances of apparent dysteleology and evil in 
the world will suggest, e.g. suffering and death caused by diseases, harsh 
environmental conditions, natural disasters, etc. Such reflection also 
calls into question the assumption of anthropocentrism that underlies 
the argument, an assumption that is especially questionable in light of 
evolutionary biology, according to which human beings have emerged 
much later as a  species, being preceded by bacteria, cockroaches and 
dinosaurs. Be that as it may, even if we were to accept the argument as 
sound, it would prove, at best, the existence of some sort of intelligent 
agency behind the creation of the universe. ‘But beyond that position’, as 
Hume famously notes, the defender of such an argument ‘cannot ascertain 
one single circumstance, and is left afterwards to fix every point of his 
theology, by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis.’46 The Argument 
from Invention so obviously begs the question that there is no need to 
proffer anything further by way of criticism to show that it fails. The first 
premise of the argument states that all existing things (animals, plants, 
etc.) are invented. But in order to accept this premise, one already needs 
to be committed to the truth of the argument’s conclusion, which states 
that there is an Inventor (i.e. God) of every existing thing in the world. 
The sort of argument for God’s oneness that is found in the Qur’an  is 
principally motivated by the thought that the existence of more than one 
divine being would (or could) result in one divine being frustrating the 
will of the other(s); and this, in turn, would (or could) result in chaos 
45 Lucius Boraks, Religions of The East (Kansas City, MO: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1988), p. 9.
46 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1779], ed. Martin Bell 
(London: Penguin, 1990), p. 79.
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and disorder in the universe. But, as Richard Swinburne has argued, it 
not at all clear that the existence of multiple deities necessarily means 
that they will fail to ‘work things out’, so to speak, in a  way that the 
activity of one deity does not interfere with what the other(s) do.47 The 
Qur’anic arguments for the existence and oneness of God are, therefore, 
problematic and consequently fail to supply epistemic justification for 
the belief that (only one) God exists.
It may be objected here that I have discussed only simple or superficial 
formulations of these arguments and that there are more sophisticated 
variants out there. For instance, the spirit of The Argument from 
Providence, as distilled from the Qur’an and formulated by Ibn Rushd, 
can be found in the more ‘updated’ Fine-Tuning Argument that rests 
on recent discoveries about the fundamental physical structure of our 
universe.48 Although this is true, it should be noted that the simplistic 
nature of the Qur’anic arguments for the existence and oneness of God is 
something that is displayed to its reader from a straightforward reading 
and interpretation of the Islamic text, as opposed to being, say, a gross 
oversimplification of more sophisticated arguments contained therein. 
What is more, merely shifting the focus to more sophisticated versions 
of the Qur’anic arguments leaves untouched and therefore intact my 
contention that the original, simple formulations are unconvincing, as 
I have argued. The import of this last point is significant since a great 
many traditional Muslims today do think that the original, simple 
formulations of the arguments for God’s existence and oneness found 
in the Qur’an  are successful. As W.M. Watt writes, commenting more 
generally on the traditionalist Muslim’s attitude towards faith and reason:
Traditionalist Muslims today like to claim that ‘Islam is a religion based 
on reason’; but if asked to elaborate this point, they can only produce 
the sort of philosophical reasoning that was in vogue in the twelfth 
century  ... [T]hey know of no philosophy since Averroes, and are 
completely unaware of the new challenges to religious belief produced 
by men like Hume and Feuerbach, not to mention our twentieth-century 
[now twenty-first century] philosophers.49
47 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, Revised Edition (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), p. 233.
48 See, for instance, Robin Collins’ ‘God, Design, and Fine-Tuning’, available at: 
<http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Revised%20Version%20of%20Fine-
tuning%20for%20anthology.doc> (last accessed 4/1/2014).
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Even contemporary defenders of traditionally simple theistic proofs 
acknowledge (even if implicitly sometimes) that such proofs require 
more updated and sophisticated defences. Consider as just one example 
the well-known Kalam Cosmological Argument,50 formulated by 
medieval Muslim thinkers like Al-Ghazali. In his Jerusalem Epistle, Al-
Ghazali states the argument as follows: ‘It is self-evident to human reason 
that there must be a  cause for the origination of anything originated. 
Since the universe is originated it follows that there was a cause for its 
origination.’51 William Lane Craig, the foremost contemporary proponent 
of this argument, concedes that his defence of the argument’s premises
took [him] into extended discussions of such recondite and profound 
subjects as Cantorian set theory, transfinite arithmetic, the ontological 
status of sets, the nature of time as tensed or tenseless, Zeno’s Paradoxes, 
Kant’s First Antinomy, contemporary Big Bang cosmology (including 
critiques of alternative or non-standard cosmological theories such as 
the Steady State model, the Oscillating model, the Vacuum Fluctuation 
model, and Quantum Gravity models), thermodynamics and physical 
eschatology, and so on and so forth.52
Craig explains that, although the overall logic of the argument is 
extremely simple, establishing the truth of the premises can be ‘a  long 
and complex affair’.53
Simplistic arguments for the existence and oneness of God of the sort 
that are found in the Qur’an are just not convincing, especially in our 
present day after thinkers like Hume, Kant, Darwin, etc., have criticized 
the plausibility of theistic arguments and explanations. But what about 
the more ‘sophisticated’ theistic proofs in contemporary Philosophy of 
49 W.M. Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1988), 
p. 5.
50 The label is William Lane Craig’s. See his ‘The Existence of God and The Beginning 
of The Universe’, available at: <http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-existence-of-god-
and-the-beginning-of-the-universe> (last accessed 4/1/2014).
51 Al-Ghazali, ‘The Jerusalem Epistle’, a dual language edition with English translation 
and commentary published as: ’Al-Ghazali’s Tract on Dogmatic Theology’, edited, 
translated, annotated and introduced by A. L. Tibawi, Islamic Quarterly, IX (1965), 65-
122 (p. 98).
52 William Lane Craig, ‘A Swift and Simple Refutation of The Kalam Cosmological 
Argument?’, available at: <http://www.reasonablefaith.org/a-swift-and-simple-
refutation-of-the-kalam-cosmological-argument> (last accessed 4/1/2014).
53 Ibid.
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Religion? It seems fair to say that whether these proofs are successful is 
controversial, not only in the Philosophy of Religion, where there is no 
consensus regarding their success (or failure), but also amongst members 
of the general public. As Robert McKim observes,
It is obvious that for every Richard Swinburne who adds up what he 
thinks to be the relevant evidence and gets a result that supports theism, 
there is a J.L. Mackie who gets an entirely different result, and, in general, 
for every theist to whom the facts of her experience appear to confirm 
that God exists there are apparently equally well qualified nontheists, 
including members of nontheistic religions, agnostics, and atheists, to 
whom the facts of their experience have no such significance.54
In any case, the Qur’anic arguments for the existence and oneness of God 
are, in their simple, original forms, unsuccessful. They do not, therefore, 
provide epistemic justification for Islamic belief.
The ‘Inimitability’ Argument for the Qur’an’s divine origin is, much 
like The Islamic Anthropological Argument, one that lacks any external, 
corroborating evidence. The conclusion of this argument is that the 
Qur’an  is a miracle and the key supporting premise is that the text of 
the Qur’an  – conveyed to use by Muhammad, an  illiterate man  – is 
inimitable. One problem with this argument is that the concept of 
a ‘miracle’ used in the conclusion is not the classical one we find in Hume, 
for whom a miracle is ‘a transgression of a law of nature by a particular 
volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent’.55 
As Ibn Rushd notes in his Incoherence of The Incoherence, the miracle of 
the Qur’an does not involve ‘an interruption in the course of nature ... 
like the changing of a rod into a serpent, but ... is established by way of 
perception and consideration for every man who has been or will be till 
the day of resurrection’.56 If the idea of violating the laws of nature is built 
into the definition of a miracle, then it is understandable why a miracle 
can be seen as providing some evidence for the existence of a God. For, 
is seems that only something like a God could explain the violation of 
a  law of nature that is confirmed to hold universally. But if an alleged 
54 Robert McKim, Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) p. 24.
55 David Hume, ‘Of Miracles’, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, available 
at: <http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/14.html> (last accessed 4/6/2014).
56 Ibn Rushd, Simon van den Bergh, (trans.), Averroes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut (London: 
Trustees of the E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, 1978), p. 315.
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‘miracle’ does not violate any laws of nature, then it becomes difficult to 
ascertain its evidential value. This is basically Swinburne’s objection to 
the Islamic ‘miracle’ of the Qur’an. ‘We have no reason to suspect that 
that illiterate creative genius cannot guess at truths normally accessible 
only to the literate,’ as Swinburne says, ‘or create a new religious style or 
movement.’57 This point becomes all the more forceful if we consider the 
premise of the argument from the Qur’an’s inimitability. The claim that 
the text of the Qur’an is stylistically inimitable is an aesthetic judgment 
and it is controversial whether such judgments are objective and can 
be evaluated according to objective criteria.58 Moreover, it is clearly 
controversial what kind of aesthetic merit in a work counts as a mark of 
divine inspiration. No traditional Muslim would, for instance, regard the 
works of Shakespeare, Shelley or Keats as divinely inspired. But why not? 
What aesthetic difference is there between, say, Shelley’s Ozymandias and 
one of the short chapters towards the end of the Qur’an, such that the 
former fails to qualify as divine inspiration while the latter does? It is 
difficult to see how one can answer this question without sliding into 
subjective and arbitrary aesthetic judgments. The fact that, outside of 
the Muslim community, there is no consensus among Arabic-speaking 
people regarding the stylistic inimitability of the Qur’an further supports 
this point. I am therefore in agreement with Rippin’s description of the 
argument from the Qur’an’s inimitability as a  ‘dogmatic one, essential 
to the proof of the status of the text, but one which operates (like many 
other religious arguments) within the presuppositions of Islam alone’.59
In sum, then, none of the four alleged sources of epistemic 
justification for Islamic belief succeed in showing that the Muslim belief 
in God’s existence and oneness, along with belief in the Prophethood 
of Muhammad, is epistemically justified. This component of Islamic 
epistemic exclusivism is therefore false. The Islamic denial of similar 
epistemic justification for beliefs that are incompatible with Islamic 
beliefs is not a  significant concern, given my purposes in this paper. 
I  will, however, note the following point. If epistemic justification 
for Islamic belief is lacking, then people who are non-Muslim cannot 
57 Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 128.
58 See Oliver Leaman, Islamic Aesthetics: An Introduction (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2004), p. 142.
59 Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, pp. 39-40.
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be regarded as perversely rejecting what they know (or, at least, are 
epistemically justified in believing) to be true. This observation dovetails 
with facts in our experience that are evident. There are plenty of people 
around us who cannot be regarded as obstinately rejecting Islamic belief. 
More specifically, there are people of integrity, people who are, that is, 
wise, careful and judicious thinkers, intelligent, clever, honest, reflective, 
serious, etc., who hold beliefs that are incompatible with Islamic belief.60 
The idea that all non-Muslims can be regarded as kafir, walking around 
with their heads held high and stubbornly rejecting Islamic belief, which 
they know to be true, is simply a theological fantasy.
3.2. Problems with Islamic Salvific Exclusivism
If the criticisms of Islamic epistemic exclusivism in the previous section 
are correct, then we have arrived at two important conclusions. First, 
Islamic belief – that is, belief in the existence and oneness of God as well 
as Muhammad’s Prophethood  – lacks epistemic justification. Second, 
and consequently, the Qur’anic stance that non-Muslims are kafirs, 
i.e. perversely rejecting Islamic belief, is implausible. As noted in the 
preceding section, the concept of the kafir is, in the Qur’an, conceptually 
tied to all cases where a person fails to respond appropriately to Islamic 
belief. That is, a person who does not practice Islamic belief fails to do 
so out of a stubborn refusal to acknowledge what he knows (or at least 
has strong epistemic justification for believing) to be true. It is clear 
from reading the Qur’an  that possessing strong epistemic justification 
is a necessary condition for being in a state of kufr. If, however, Islamic 
belief lacks epistemic justification (and therefore cannot constitute a case 
of knowledge either),61 then it follows that no non-Muslim is in a state of 
kufr. If a non-Muslim cannot be labelled as a kafir, then this has serious 
ramifications for salvific exclusivism in Islam.
As noted previously, according to the traditional Islamic 
understanding of salvific exclusivism, failure to achieve salvation is 
treated as equivalent to condemnation in hell. The main reason that the 
Qur’an cites for people’s eternal punishment in hell is that they refused to 
acknowledge the truth of Islamic belief. Each inhabitant of hell is a kafir. 
60 The description of ‘people of integrity’ here comes from Robert McKim, Religious 
Ambiguity and Religious Diversity, p. 129.
61 According to most epistemologists, epistemic justification is at least a  necessary 
condition for knowledge.
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Now, this particular aspect of Islamic salvific exclusivism opens itself up 
to criticism in at least two different ways.
First, one can criticize whether the traditional understanding of hell in 
Islam is compatible with God’s Compassion and Mercy, which is stressed 
throughout the Qur’an. Taken at face value, the Qur’anic descriptions 
of the punishment that awaits those who reject God are, quite frankly, 
sadistic and horrifying, to say the least. Let me just consider a few verses 
here. First and foremost, the main description of hell in the Qur’an  is 
a fire whose fuel is men and stones (2:24). God will ensure that the blazing 
fire of hell never subsides (17:97). It is eternal and inescapable (5:37). 
As soon as the fire of hell finishes roasting the skin of its inhabitants, 
God will create new skins for them to continue the cycle of punishment 
(4:56). People in hell will have their foreheads, flanks and backs branded. 
They will be given purulent water to drink, which they will be able to 
sip but not swallow (14:16-17). They may also be given boiling water 
that will tear their bowels (47:15). The thirsty who ask for drink will be 
showered with water that is like molten lead, scalding their faces (18:29). 
Many more such verses can be cited, all of which effectively portray hell 
as a gruesome torture chamber and the God that created it as a God of 
(excessive!) retribution. Now, even if each inhabitant of hell is a kafir, the 
Qur’an’s description of God’s punishment awaiting such a person simply 
does not seem reconcilable with His Compassion and Mercy. Indeed, 
even if this point is considered with respect to God’s Justice alone, where 
a person did not acknowledge His Creator appropriately and give Him 
‘His due’ as Sheikh Al-Munajjid suggests, it is hard to see how this sort 
of punishment is fair. At most, the kafir refuses to acknowledge God 
and sin for a hundred years or so, an infinitesimal flicker in the timeline 
of creation from the perspective of an eternal deity. In response, God 
retaliates disproportionately by condemning the kafir to horrific forms 
of torture, eternally. In thinking about all this, one has ample reason for 
taking seriously the idea that perhaps a  literal interpretation of verses 
that describe hell in the Qur’an  is wrong. Perhaps, as Muhammad Ali 
suggests, the doctrine of hell should understood as remedial (by taking 
mention of the fire of hell as a metaphor for purification) rather than 
retributive.62
62 Muhammad Ali, The Religion of Islam (Cairo: National Publication & Printing 
House, 1967), p. 307.
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Rather than pursue this line of criticism, which certainly has force, 
another simple argument against Islamic salvific exclusivism is to point 
out that, whatever the Qur’an may say about the fate of the kafir in hell 
and however plausible or not this may be, it is simply inapplicable to the 
situation of non-Muslims in our world. Why? Because a non-Muslim, 
as noted, cannot be regarded as a  kafir. It remains an  open question, 
then, whether non-Muslims who hold beliefs that are incompatible with 
Islamic belief may be saved. Surely, given the Islamic understanding 
of God as Gracious, Merciful, Forgiving, etc., such a possibility has to 
be taken seriously. Rejecting it gives rise to the sort of point that Hick 
makes several times in his work:
[T]the basic criticism of both Christian and Muslim [salvific] exclusivism 
is that it denies by implication that God, the sole creator of the world and 
of all humanity, is loving, gracious and merciful, and that His love and 
mercy extend to all humankind. If God is the creator of the entire human 
race, is it credible that God would set up a system by which hundreds of 
millions of men, women and children, the majority of the human race, 
are destined through no fault of their own to eternal torment in hell?63
Hick’s basic criticism here can be further strengthened by noting that, at 
least as far as Islamic salvific exclusivism is concerned, non-Muslims are 
not guilty of kufr.
3.3. Islamic Alethic Exclusivism
It should be clear that my criticisms of both Islamic epistemic and 
salvific exclusivism have no bearing on alethic exclusivism in Islam. 
As explained earlier, exclusivism with respect to truth is both a  basic 
principle of rationality and grounded in a  natural interpretation of 
the Qur’an  (see section 2.1). A  person can, however, be an  alethic 
exclusivist in an Islamic context while rejecting the traditional Islamic 
understanding of both epistemic and salvific exclusivism (of course, 
which religious propositions the Muslim alethic exclusivist affirms and 
denies may change in light of the criticisms proffered in this paper!). 
Equivocating on the different forms of religious exclusivism can lead to 
confusion. A clear example of such equivocation and confusion can be 
found in Gavin D’Costa’s criticism of Hick’s pluralism. D’Costa argues 
63 John Hick, ‘Religious Pluralism and Islam’, available at: <http://www.johnhick.org.
uk/article11.html> (last accessed 4/6/2014).
209CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC EXCLUSIVISM
that religious pluralism must always be a form of exclusivism and that 
nothing called pluralism really exists. This is because even the religious 
pluralist holds some form of truth criteria and anything that falls short of 
that criteria is not true. In this regard, religious pluralism and exclusivism 
operate within the same logical structure.64 But this sort of objection fails 
to take into consideration the fact that both religious exclusivism and 
pluralism can be understood with reference to a number of other issues 
such as epistemic justification and salvation, alongside the question of 
truth.
IV. CONCLUSION
Religious exclusivism, especially the version that I  have termed 
Traditional Islamic Exclusivism, has a  number of philosophical, 
theological and practical implications. Thinking carefully about the 
practical implications is especially important today, where the Islamic 
religion is facing increasing scrutiny because of the religiously inspired, 
but morally questionable, actions of many Muslims. To consider just one 
recent example, in 2012 Afghan senators wanted to remove the word 
‘friendship’ in a  pact with France based on their belief that Muslims 
cannot be friends with infidels.65 Several other examples can be cited 
where morally questionable or wrong actions by Muslims were inspired by 
their commitment to Traditional Islamic Exclusivism. The vast majority 
of Muslims in the world, of course, live their lives peacefully. What they 
may not recognize, however, is that their actions are not congruent with 
the traditional Islamic understanding of religious exclusivism. For this, 
they are often shunned by Imams from the pulpits in the mosques who 
argue that, in light of Islamic theology, Muslim practice needs to change 
(e.g. no mingling with non-Muslims, taking them as friends, etc.). But 
perhaps it is not the religious practice of most Muslims that needs to 
change, but, rather, their traditional understanding of Islamic theology, 
including religious exclusivism.
64 Gavin D’Costa, ‘The Impossibility of A Pluralist View of Religions’, Religious Studies, 
Vol. 32, Is. 2 (1996), 223-32 (pp. 225f.).
65 The Telegraph, ‘Afghan bid to “de-friend” France’, October 3 2012, available at: 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9584584/Afghan-bid-
to-de-friend-France.html> (last accessed 4/6/2014).
